Abstract. A simple one-way function along with its proposed application in symmetric cryptography is described. The function is computable with three elementary operations on permutations per byte. Inverting the function, using the most efficient method known to the author, is estimated to require an average computational effort of about 2 260 operations. The proposed stream cipher based on the function was designed to be efficient in software implementations and, in particular, to eliminate the known weaknesses of the alleged RC4 keystream generator while retaining most of its speed and simplicity.
Introduction
A simple transformation of permutations appearing to be hard to invert is described together with its proposed practical application in a software-efficient symmetric encryption algorithm.
The transformation, here termed "VMPC" function as an abbreviation of "Variably Modified Permutation Composition", is a combination of elementary operations on permutations and integers. The simplest variant of the function can be coded with three basic "MOV" instructions from the Intel 80x86 processor instruction set per byte. When applied on 256-element permutations (a comfortable size in practical cryptographic applications), the function requires an estimated average of 2 260 computational operations to be inverted using the most efficient method known to the author.
The very low computational cost required to obtain practical one-way property makes the function a plausible candidate for cryptographic applications. The simplicity of the function could also raise a question whether it might be possible to prove a lower bound on the complexity of inverting it. This currently is an open problem and a possible subject of future research.
A proposition of an encryption algorithm constructed as a stream cipher based on the VMPC function is described in sections 8-14. The cipher was designed to be both efficient in software implementations and to resist the known attacks against this kind of algorithms (like the alleged RC4 keystream generator) -in particular against attacks distinguishing the keystream from a truly random source and attacks against the cipher's Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA).
Definition of the VMPC function

Notation:
n, P, Q : P, Q : n-element permutations. For simplicity of further references P and Q are assumed to be one-to-one mappings A → A; A = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} k : Level of the function; k < n + : addition modulo n
Definition:
A k-level VMPC function, referred to as VMPC k , is such transformation of P into Q, where
x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, P i is an n-element permutation such that P i [x] = f i (P [x]), where f i is any function such that P i [x] = P [x] = P j [x] for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, i = j. For simplicity of further references f i is assumed to be f i (x) = x + i Example: Q = VMPC 1 (P ) :
3 Difficulty of inverting the VMPC function n-element permutation P has to be recovered from the n-element permutation Q, where Q = VMPC k (P ).
By definition each element of Q is formed by k + 2, usually different, elements of P . One element of Q can be formed by many possible configurations of elements of P (e.g. for Q = VMPC 1 (P ) : All possible configurations are equally likely to be correct. If any of them is chosen, it needs to be verified with all of those elements of Q which use any of the elements of P included in the picked configuration.
Each element of P is usually used to form k + 2 different elements of Q thus (k + 2) × (k + 1) new elements of Q usually need to be inverted (all k +2 elements of P used to form each of these elements of Q need to be revealed) to verify the elements of P from the picked configuration.
Because the cycle structure of P is corrupted by the addition operation(s) it is usually impossible to find two different elements of Q, which share at least k + 1 elements of P .
Instead only such element of Q can usually be found, name it Q [x] , which shares only one of the k + 2 elements of P with another element of Q. This forces k elements of P used to form Q[x] to be guessed to invert Q [x] .
However at each new guessed element of P there usually occur k + 1 new elements of Q which use this element of P and which need to be inverted to verify the guess.
The algorithm falls into a loop, where at every step usually k new elements of P need to be guessed to enable continuation of verification of the previously guessed elements. In consequence the k +2 elements of P picked at the beginning of the process indirectly depend on all n elements of Q.
The described scenario is the case usually. In some circumstances the verification process can be simplified by benefiting from coincidences (where for example it is possible to find two elements of Q, which share more than one element of P (e.g. for Q = VMPC 1 (P ) :
A proposed algorithm for inverting the VMPC function (Section 6) was optimized to benefit from the possible coincidences. The average number of elements of P which need to be guessed for n = 256 was reduced to about 34 for 1-level VMPC function, to about 57 for 2-level VMPC, to about 77 for 3-level VMPC and to about 92 for 4-level VMPC function. The 3 MOV instructions in Table 1 store the EAX-th element of permutation Q, where Q=VMPC 1 (P ), in the AL (and EAX) register.
Example values of the VMPC function
Values of 1,2,3 and 4-level VMPC function of an example 10-element permutation P are given in Table 2 : Table 2 . Example values of the VMPC function index 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 P 2 0 4 3 6 9 7 8 5 1 Q 1 =VMPC 1 (P ) 9 3 8 6 5 4 1 7 2 0 Q2=VMPC2(P ) 0 9 2 5 8 7 3 1 6 4 Q 3 =VMPC 3 (P ) 3 4 9 5 0 2 7 6 1 8 Q 4 =VMPC 4 (P ) 8 5 3 1 6 7 0 2 9 4 6 Proposed algorithm for inverting the VMPC function
The algorithm outputs an n-element permutation P satisfying Q = VMPC k (P ).
Notation:
P : n-element table the searched permutation will be stored in X, Y : temporary variables Argument, V alue, Base, P arameter of an element of P : For an element P [x] = y : x is termed the Argument; x can be either the Base or the P arameter. y is termed the V alue; y is the P arameter or the Base respectively. 
The Deducing Process
The Deducing Process reveals all possible elements of P given Q and given the already revealed elements of P . 
Notation as in Section 6, with:
C, A : temporary variables
Assume that Q[0] = 9 and that the following elements of P are revealed:
Assume that Q [7] = 2 and that the following elements of P are revealed: The Selecting Process selects such new element of P to be revealed which is expected to maximize the number of elements of P possible to deduce in further steps of the inverting algorithm. The Selecting Process outputs a selected Base and a randomly chosen P arameter of a new element of P . 
Notation as in
Complexity of inverting the VMPC function (Table 3) was approximated as an average number of times the Deducing Process (step 2) needs to be run by the inverting algorithm described in Section 6 until permutation P satisfies Q = VMPC k (P ).
Average numbers of elements of P which need to be assumed are given in Table  3 in brackets.
Complexities of inverting the VMPC function of the following levels were approximated: The Cipher should require no initial outputs to be discarded directly after running the KSA.
Probability that the Cipher's output will enter a short cycle should be negligibly low.
Output generated by the Cipher should be free from statistical biases.
Effort required to recover the internal state from the Cipher's output should be higher than a brute-force search of all possible 512-bit keys.
The KSA should resist related-key attacks and attacks against the scheme of using the Initialization Vector (IV).
The KSA should provide random-looking diffusion of changes of one byte of the key of size up to 512 bits onto the generated permutation and onto output generated by the Cipher.
Description of the VMPC Stream Cipher
The algorithm generates a stream of 8-bit values.
Variables:
P : 256-byte 
The VMPC Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) transforms a cryptographic key and (optionally) an Initialization Vector into a 256-element permutation P and initializes variable s.
Variables as in Section 9, with:
c : fixed length of the cryptographic key in bytes, 16 ≤ c ≤ 64 4. n = m modulo 256
If Initialization Vector is used: execute step 8:
8. for m from 0 to 767: execute steps 9-11: 9. n = m modulo 256 Table 6 gives 16 test output-bytes generated by the VMPC Stream Cipher for a given 16-byte key (K) and a given 16-byte Initialization Vector (V ): Probability of two consecutive outputs being equal appears to be an important parameter for a cipher based, as VMPC is, on an internal permutation (P ). A sole permutation is obviously distinguishable from a truly random stream as its values never repeat. The construction of a cipher based on an internal permutation should corrupt the regular structure of the permutation in such way as to force the outputs to repeat with a random-looking probability.
This section explains theoretically why the probability of consecutive outputs generated by the VMPC Stream Cipher being equal is the same as we would expect from a random oracle, i.e. that P rob(out
where N is the word-size of the Cipher in bits; the standard value of N is 8.
To compute the probability, two scenarios need to be considered: (1) -there is no swap in step 5 (Table 4) and (2) -there is a swap in step 5.
In (1): P rob(no-swap)=P rob(s[x] = n[x]) = 2 −N
As a result of (1) in steps x and x + 1 are different permutations. This probability was also confirmed experimentally.
By combining the probabilities in scenarios (1)(1a)(1aR), (1)(1b)(1bR) and (2)(2R) we get:
which ends the proof.
Recovering the Cipher's internal state
A method analogous to the Forward Tracking Algorithm proposed by Mister and Tavares in [3] was applied to break the VMPC Stream Cipher. Following this approach an average of over 2 900 computational operations is estimated to be required to recover the Cipher's internal state from its output. output bytes. None of the measured frequencies showed a statistically significant deviation from its expected value of 1 / 16777216. Frequencies of occurrence of each of the possible 2 16 configurations of an output value and the n variable (out [x] , n) were measured in a stream of 2 39.4 output bytes. None of the measured frequencies showed a statistically significant deviation from its expected value of 1 / 65536.
Digraph and trigraph probabilities
Single-output probabilities
First-outputs probabilities
Frequencies of occurrence of each of the possible 2 8 values on each of the first 256 byte-positions of the keystream generated directly after running the KSA were measured in a sample of 2 40.3 bytes of the Cipher's output for 2 32.3 different keys. None of the measured frequencies showed a statistically significant deviation from its expected value of 1 / 256. [In [6] Mantin and Shamir show that the second output of RC4 takes on value 0 with probability 1 / 128 rather than 1 / 256.]
Short cycles
Probability of entering a cycle not longer than X Following Knuth's [1] , probability of entering a cycle not longer than X for an n-element random permutation is X/n.
To compare cycle lengths in the output of the VMPC Stream Cipher to cycle lengths in a random permutation, the Cipher was scaled down to use M -element permutations for M ∈ {4, 5, . . . , 10}.
The total number of M !×M 2 possible internal states of the Cipher is determined by all possible configurations of permutation P and variables s and n.
The observed cycle lengths, listed in the Appendix, do not show an appreciable difference from a model of cycles in a random (M ! × M 2 )-element permutation. Probability of entering a cycle not longer than X by the VMPC Stream Cipher is conjectured from this to be approximately X/(256! × 256
2 ) ∼ = X/2 1700 . An example estimate is that probability that the Cipher's output will enter a cycle not longer than 2 850 is about 1 / 2 850 . 
Finney states
Binary derivatives of bit output sequences
This family of tests was inspired by Golic's [8] , where the author describes a statistical bias in the second binary derivative of the least significant bit output sequence of RC4. The author finds that the bias allows the attacker to distinguish RC4 output from a truly random source using about 64 N /225 outputs, where N is the cipher's word-size in bits (e.g. for N = 8 the required length is about 2 40 ) 1 .
Output generated by the VMPC Stream Cipher showed no bias in this family of tests. The following objectives were taken in testing VMPC here: N = 7 word-size was chosen to make the tested algorithm as close to the real 8-bit one as possible while significantly decreasing the output-sequence length required to reveal the bias for RC4 (for 7-bit RC4 -about 2 34.2 outputs according to the original estimates in [8] ). First, second and third binary derivatives of all 7 bits output sequences were tested (21 frequencies of (out
were measured for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 6}, A ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where out k [x] denotes k-th bit of x-th output word).
In a sequence of 2 44.8 (about 10 13.5 ) VMPC outputs tested according to this approach none of the measured frequencies showed a statistically significant deviation from its expected value of 0.5.
Equal neighboring outputs probabilities
Frequencies of occurrence of situations where there occurs a given number (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and over 5) of direct (generated consecutively) and indirect (separated by one output byte) equal neighboring outputs in the consecutive 256-byte sub-streams of the Cipher's output and the average total number of direct and indirect equal neighboring outputs -showed no statistically significant deviation from their expected values in a sample of 2 43.1 bytes of the Cipher's output.
Statistical tests on the Cipher's output
Keystreams generated by the VMPC Stream Cipher were tested by two popular batteries of statistical tests -the DIEHARD battery [11] and the NIST statistical tests suite [12] . No bias was found by any of the 15 tests included in the DIEHARD battery or by any of the 16 tests from the NIST suite.
14 Analysis of the VMPC Key Scheduling Algorithm
The VMPC Key Scheduling Algorithm was tested for diffusion of changes of the cryptographic key onto the generated permutation and onto the Cipher's output. A change of one byte of the cryptographic key of size 128, 256 and 512 bits appears to cause a random-looking change in the generated permutation and in the Cipher's output.
The KSA was designed to provide the diffusion without the use of the Initialization Vector and the tests were run without the IV. The Initialization Vector would obviously mix the generated permutation further, which would improve the diffusion effect.
Given numbers of equal permutation elements probabilities
Frequencies of occurrence of situations where in two permutations, generated from keys differing in one byte, there occurs a given number (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) of equal elements in the corresponding positions and the average number of equal elements in the corresponding positions -showed no statistically significant deviation from their expected values in samples of 2 33.2 pairs of 128-, 256-and 512-bit keys.
14.2 Given numbers of equal Cipher's outputs probabilities 
Equal corresponding permutation elements probabilities
Frequencies of occurrence of situations where the elements in the corresponding positions of permutations generated from keys differing in one byte are equal (for each of the 256 positions) -showed no statistically significant deviation from their expected value in samples of 2 33.2 pairs of 128-, 256-and 512-bit keys.
Conclusions
A simple one-way function together with a description of the most efficient method of inverting it found have been presented. An open problem is whether the simplicity of the function helps make a hypothetical attempt to prove a lower bound on the complexity of inverting it worth undertaking.
A proposed stream cipher which employs the function was given together with some analysis of the cipher's cryptographic strength, statistical properties of the cipher's output and statistical properties of the cipher's Key Scheduling Algorithm.
The analyses performed so far did not reveal any weakness in the design and indicated that the cipher has a number of security advantages over the alleged RC4 keystream generator while retaining most of its speed and simplicity.
